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PUBLIC HEALTH VERSUS COURT-
SPONSORED SECRECY 
DANIEL J. GIVELBER* AND ANTHONY ROBBINS** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Public health practice—the prevention of disease and injury and the protec-
tion of the population—relies on access to information.  Legal practice treats in-
formation very differently: it is a weapon; has power and value, and it is rarely 
yielded without getting something in return.  Civil litigation uncovers a great 
deal of otherwise unavailable information about practices and products which 
may cause disease and injury.  However, common practices in and related to 
lawsuits, trials, and courts, such as protective orders, sealing orders, and confi-
dential settlements, can deprive public health authorities and the public itself of 
information that might be helpful to prevent disease, injury, disability, and 
death.  In the United States, this conflict between public health and legal prac-
tice over the availability of information is nowhere more evident than in tort 
litigation.  It remains both highly contentious and unresolved.1  This article de-
scribes the important debate about “court-sponsored” secrecy: Should courts, as 
public entities devoted to dispute resolution, tolerate, endorse, or protect se-
crecy when the sequestered information might help protect the public health? 
An examination of public health decisions—decisions concerning how to 
protect the health of the population—reveals the kinds of information that can 
be useful when the objective is to ensure such protection. Information is, how-
ever, only one of the elements needed to protect the public. We do not suggest 
that whenever and wherever information is available, action to protect the pub-
lic will certainly result.  What follows is perhaps, an overly simple look at public 
health. 
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 1. See, e.g., Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 181 N.J. 1, 853 A.2d 880 (2004) (rejecting an 
application by public interest and media groups and opposed by pharmaceutical and manufacturing 
groups for access to information revealed during pretrial discovery in a lawsuit involving allegations of 
tread separation in Goodyear tires). 
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II 
PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 
Harmful exposures that injure people or cause disease, either immediately 
or after a latent period, are likely to be avoidable or preventable. This makes 
them an appropriate target of public health intervention.  An investigation may 
begin with any of several observations. 
Starting an investigation with a patient, the nature of the illness or injury 
may suggest a particular exposure: a patient short of breath, for example, may 
be examined by chest x-ray, which may show a pattern typical of a pneumoco-
niosis (silicosis, asbestosis, and other diseases which restrict breathing by caus-
ing fibrous changes in the lungs) caused by inhaling fine dust.  The patient’s 
work history then leads to examining the workplace, revealing the kind of dust, 
at what concentration, and often other workers similarly exposed.  Investigating 
the process that produces the dust may suggest whether and how the dust can 
be controlled and exposure to it eliminated. 
When a public health investigation begins with the hazardous agent, perhaps 
the dust identified above, it can search the human environment in a community 
for places, processes, and products that expose people to the same dust and the 
risk of similar disease, disability, or death. To how much, where, and for how 
long are people exposed? How can the exposure be avoided? Can a safer mate-
rial or agent be substituted? 
When a public health investigation is triggered by an outbreak of disease af-
fecting many people, investigators may seek detailed information about each 
individual affected to learn of a common exposure.  Sometimes outbreaks go 
undetected by public health agencies because no one has assembled the cases 
that would identify an exposed group or, more importantly, the person or cor-
poration who has the information keeps it secret.  For example, for several 
years Ford knew its Explorers were rolling over and Bridgestone/Firestone 
knew treads were peeling off certain of its tires.2  Neither company informed a 
public health agency that might have acted to save lives. 
Gathering private information to serve a public has long characterized pub-
lic health practice.3  Even before bacteriology made it possible to associate in-
fectious diseases with particular microbes, public health authorities went be-
yond sanitation to isolate and quarantine sick people from the rest of the 
population.  When disease control depended on isolation or treatment of carri-
ers, as for tuberculosis and “venereal diseases,” public health authorities rou-
tinely tracked down contacts, demanding to know with whom the patient lived, 
worked, shared needles, or had sex.  No doubt, public officials have occasionally 
 
 2. Anita Kumar, Attention Shifts from Firestone to Ford, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 17, 2001, 
at A1, available at  http://www.sptimes.com/News/061701/Firestone/Attention_shifts_from.shtml. 
 3. See Anthony Robbins & Phyllis Freeman, How Organized Medical Care Can Advance Public 
Health, 114 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 120, 122 (1999). 
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misused this information, but our society, more often than not, trusts public 
health agencies to protect it from misuse when they seek such information. 
III 
LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS 
The assumption that public health authorities need and should have infor-
mation in order to protect the population seems at odds with the actions of par-
ties in many lawsuits, particularly civil suits that seek compensation for alleged 
torts.  When the information about the cause of disease or injury is sufficiently 
convincing to cause the parties to settle, it also might be sufficient to convince 
public health authorities to take actions to protect others similarly exposed or at 
least to undertake research to learn about the consequences of similar expo-
sures. 
Lawyers acting for their clients often seek help from courts to enforce se-
crecy.  They can ask for protective orders to conceal information uncovered in 
pretrial discovery.  The defendant frequently asks the judge to order the plain-
tiff not to divulge this information to the public or even to government agencies 
authorized to protect the public.  Lawyers can also ask judges for sealing orders 
during or at the conclusion of litigation to protect records from public scrutiny.  
Similarly, after the parties have agreed to settle, and occasionally after a verdict, 
attorneys can ask the judge to enter an order for a confidential settlement, pro-
hibiting, on pain of contempt, the parties or their lawyers from revealing infor-
mation contained in the settlement.  This prohibition might include talking with 
the press, cooperating with regulatory authorities—the Food and Drug Admini-
stration, the Environmental Protection Agency, or the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration, for example—and sometimes prohibiting even an 
admission that there was a dispute in the first place. Or the parties to a lawsuit 
might agree between themselves as a condition of settlement that the informa-
tion revealed during the pretrial proceedings remains confidential.  Although 
not formally “court-sponsored” in the sense that the court played a role in the 
initial terms of secrecy, courts can become involved if one party to a private 
confidentiality agreement sues the other, claiming breach of contract. 
Protective orders and other secrecy agreements have shielded many pat-
terns of injury and disease associated with dozens of materials, products, and 
processes, such as pharmaceuticals, truck and automobile design, child car seats, 
cigarette lighters, school lunch tables, and water slides.  Three well-known ex-
amples illustrate the problem: asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and Bridge-
stone/Firestone tires. 
Asbestos was perhaps the earliest, and certainly among the most pervasive 
and devastating, public health hazards sequestered by court-sponsored secrecy.  
Eleven asbestos exposure victims, suffering from asbestosis, settled their lawsuit 
against Johns Manville Company in 1933.  Their attorney won $30,000 for his 
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clients, but agreed he would not “directly or indirectly participate in . . . bring-
ing . . . new actions against the Corporation.”4  Only forty-five years later did 
anyone discover this agreement.  Both asbestos producers and corporate users 
of the mineral fiber had hidden this fact from workers and customers.5  During 
that time, asbestos, used in many products from insulation to brakes to concrete 
pipe, caused not only a deadly pneumoconiosis, but lung cancer and meso-
thelioma.  In 1981, federal scientists published data showing that asbestos con-
tributed to causing more cancer cases than any other workplace exposure.6 
The Dalkon Shield was an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD) shaped 
like a turtle shell with prongs and a string tail.  It was sold by A.H. Robins start-
ing in 1971 and was used by more than two million American women.  The mul-
tifilament tail string wicked pathogenic bacteria from its vaginal end into the 
uterus, where the bacteria could cause infections—pelvic inflammatory dis-
ease—and induce septic abortions.  The prongs or fins penetrated the endo-
metrium, contributing further to these infections.  The Robins Company knew 
of these design flaws when it began marketing the IUD in 1971.7  Despite thou-
sands of reports of problems, however, Robins continued to market the Dalkon 
Shield and aggressively defended routine lawsuits while reaching confidential 
settlements in cases involving the risk of disclosure of particularly damaging in-
formation.8  By the time Robins ceased worldwide sales of the Dalkon Shield in 
April 1975 (it had withdrawn the IUD from the domestic market under FDA 
pressure the previous year), fifteen deaths and 245 nonfatal septic abortions at-
tributable to the IUD had been reported. 9 
More recently, Bridgestone/Firestone tires mounted on Ford Explorers had 
resulted in at least 250 injuries and eighty deaths in the United States when, in 
2000, a pattern of secrecy and confidentially settled lawsuits became public.  
The companies had known for several years about the tire safety defect that 
caused tread to peel off and the vehicles to roll over.10  When sued by injured 
citizens, the companies regularly sought protective orders about the design and 
manufacture of Firestone tires and Explorers.  About 6.5 million Firestone tires 
 
 4. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 114 
(1985). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Kenneth Bridbord, Pierre Decoufle, Joseph F. Fraumeni, Jr., David G. Hoel, Robert N. 
Hoover, David P. Rall, Umberto Saffiotti, Marvin A. Schneiderman & Aurthur C. Upton, Estimates of 
the Fraction of Cancer in the United States Related to Occupational Factors, in BANBURY REPORT 9: 
QUANTIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONAL CANCER, App. (Richard Peto & Marvin Schneiderman eds., 
1981). 
 7. RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD 
BANKRUPTCY 7–8 (1991). 
 8. SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LORD’S JUSTICE 81 (1985). 
 9. SOBOL, supra note 7, at 11. 
 10. In some parts of the world, Bridgestone manufactured its Firestone tires with a nylon cap to 
prevent the loss of tread and had recalled the tires with the design flaw in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia.  
U.S. regulators were not informed. 
07__GIVELBER_ROBBINS.DOC 10/4/2006  9:06 AM 
Summer 2006] PUBLIC HEALTH VERSUS COURT-SPONSORED SECRECY 135 
were in use, including those on 4 million Ford Explorers, when Firestone re-
called 14.4 million tires in 2000.11 
IV 
THE CASE AGAINST SECRECY 
The United States tort system has significant influence on the safety-related 
decisions made by those who produce the vast majority of products used and 
consumed by the American public.  It is also a major influence on systemic be-
haviors that might endanger people.  The tort system can achieve the econo-
mist’s dream of forcing the avoidance of unnecessary injuries only if it generates 
accurate signals about the costs imposed by particular products or practices.  
Yet secrecy agreements are designed, among other things, to avoid enforcement 
by suppressing information that would otherwise affect the behavior of other 
injured parties and those at risk of injury. 
The public health case against the secret resolution of lawsuits involving 
dangerous products and practices is straightforward.  Suppressing information 
about the dangers inherent in corporate behavior and consumer products de-
prives regulators, litigants, and consumers of knowledge relating to safety.  
Regulators might have acted earlier with respect to the dangers posed by asbes-
tos, the Dalkon Shield, and Bridgestone/Firestone tires had they been aware of 
the number of lawsuits, the settlements, or information revealed in pretrial dis-
covery.  Other potential litigants might have been encouraged to sue earlier and 
in greater numbers had they been aware that their injuries were not unique.  
These suits, in turn, could well have affected the manufacturer’s calculus of 
when the liability generated by continuing to produce or market a particular 
product outweighed the profit flowing from product sales. 
The free flow of information might advance public health in a more straight-
forward fashion. Consumers armed with information about the dangerous at-
tributes of a product might well choose not to consume it.  Cigarette smoking 
declined significantly in this country long before any cigarette smoker suc-
ceeded in holding a tobacco company liable for disease.12 
Would the world have been a safer place if there had been no secrecy agree-
ments of any kind in connection with tort litigation?  There is no way to provide 
an empirical answer to this question because we inhabit a world in which se-
crecy agreements are ubiquitous.  If we were to rerun the film of the past fifty 
years, keeping everything constant but eliminating secrecy agreements respect-
ing asbestos, Dalkon shield, Bridgestone/Firestone tire, and the like, earlier and 
more complete information about the dangers of these products would almost 
 
 11. Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to 
Compel and Opposition to Protective Order, Trahan v. Ford Motor Co., No. 99-62989 (61st Dist. of 
Harris County, Tex. Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/OpenCourt/ 
articles.cfm?ID=1070. 
 12. See Phillip Cook & Jens Ludwig, Fact-Free Gun Policy?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (2003) 
(citing the role of scientific research and public awareness in causing the smoking decline). 
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certainly have produced earlier recalls and withdrawals, thus reducing injuries 
and deaths. 
To the (unknowable) extent that a secrecy agreement is today a sine qua 
non of settlement, without such agreements there would be fewer settlements 
and more trials.  Plaintiffs would lose some of the cases in which they have re-
ceived a settlement, both because of the vagaries of litigation and because the 
realization that every case would have to be tried might reduce the enthusiasm 
of plaintiffs’ lawyers for filing claims in less than clear cases. Some of these “less 
than clear” cases may be the early cases that begin the process of establishing 
that a new Dalkon Shield or Bridgestone/Firestone tire may be dangerous. 
Although it is an extreme example, the extraordinary success of the tobacco 
industry’s “scorched-earth” litigation policy, which succeeded in avoiding any 
judgments against a tobacco company for more than forty years, should not be 
overlooked.  The success of the tobacco companies turned largely on their abil-
ity to blame the victim—a defense not likely to be available with most other 
dangerous products.13 Nonetheless, if a particular defendant or industry, moti-
vated by the realization that secret settlements cannot occur, chose to litigate 
every case, fewer plaintiffs would receive compensation that might otherwise be 
offered in a secret settlement.  This might be a victory for public health, but the 
plaintiff who forewent a likely settlement in return for the uncertainty of trial 
might not see it that way. 
Assuming that the defendants behave at all rationally, the cases in which a 
defendant would refuse to settle without a secrecy agreement are likely to be 
the cases in which they consider disclosures to be very damaging.  If the defen-
dants know their business, then, a requirement that all tort cases go to trial or 
settle without a secrecy agreement is likely to lead to the disclosure of consid-
erably more damaging information concerning products and practices than cur-
rently occurs. Plaintiffs would win a fair number of these cases, and the public 
health would likely be enhanced as a result of the information thus disclosed. 
These arguments reflect an instrumentalist view of the role of courts and 
litigation: secrecy is bad because it reduces the public goods that come from 
open litigation and increases what David Luban has referred to as the “public 
bads.”14  A competing view is that in resolving private disputes, courts are 
merely articulating public values and that the “reasoned elaboration and visible 
expression of public values” is an end in itself.15  On this view, settlements gen-
erally are questionable, secret settlements particularly so. 
 
 13. Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law, 73 IND. L.J. 867, 881-82 (1998). 
 14. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2626 (1995). 
 15. Id. 
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V 
THE CASE FOR SECRECY 
Those who support secrecy agreements respond to the public health case 
against concealment in two ways.  The first acknowledges that secrecy may put 
some at risk but gives more weight to other values—autonomy, privacy, and ef-
ficiency.16  If courts exist primarily to serve the parties and the parties can agree 
to a settlement—even a secret one—the court has no independent interest in 
the dispute.  For the court to insert itself in the matter interferes needlessly with 
the autonomy of the parties.  Litigation might reveal confidential information 
damaging to one or both parties that had no relevance to public health.  If se-
crecy disappears once a lawsuit is filed, frivolous suits may be brought simply to 
uncover private and embarrassing information.  Even when the lawsuit is not 
frivolous, public disclosure of information generated through discovery—such 
as the number of sexual partners of a woman injured by a Dalkon Shield—may 
injure a party without serving any public safety interest.  Finally, a trial is a no-
toriously inefficient way to resolve a dispute.  Rules prohibiting secret settle-
ments would likely increase the number of trials.  This would inconvenience 
parties who would have gladly settled in secrecy and would impede courts’ abil-
ity to hear and resolve other disputes that cannot be settled, even with a secrecy 
agreement. 
A second response to the notion of a rule barring secrecy agreements is that 
the public health case remains anecdotal and therefore unproven.17  At a mini-
mum, the argument proceeds, speculative concerns based on anecdotes without 
supporting statistical evidence of harm to the public health do not outweigh the 
values inherent in secrecy.  This argument can be advanced because no one has 
assessed quantitatively the public health consequences of secrecy agreements. 
Such an assessment would be a difficult task as it depends upon speculation as 
to how public health authorities and consumers would have behaved had there 
been no secrecy agreements. 
VI 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Assuming current secrecy-agreement practices compromise the public 
health, how can this problem be addressed?  Prescriptions put forward to cor-
rect the problem have been directed at judges (and the court system) and law-
yers.  For judges and courts, the most straightforward response is to refuse to 
enter protective orders calling for secrecy relating to materials divulged during 
pretrial discovery or settlement agreements.  Thus, someone who breaches a 
confidentiality agreement would no longer risk being in contempt of court.  This 
 
 16. Richard A. Epstein, The Disclosure Dilemma: Why a Ban on Secret Legal Settlements Does 
More Harm than Good, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002 at D1. 
 17. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 427, 480 (1991). 
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approach, however, does not prevent the parties themselves, without involving 
the court, from signing confidentiality agreements with respect to discovery or 
settlement. 
Another possible approach is to declare confidentiality agreements in dero-
gation of public health or safety as contrary to public policy and thus unen-
forceable.  That is, rather than simply insist that courts not turn confidentiality 
agreements into enforceable judicial orders, we could insist that courts refuse to 
enforce confidentiality agreements that suppress information relevant to the 
public health. 
Focusing on the behavior of lawyers rather than judges, one scholar has pro-
posed an ethical rule barring a lawyer from 
offering or making an agreement, whether in connection with a lawsuit or otherwise, 
to prevent or restrict the availability to the public of information that the lawyer rea-
sonably believes directly concerns a substantial danger to the public health or safety or 
to the health or safety of any particular individual.18 
Such a rule obviates the possibility that the judge might never learn of a confi-
dentiality agreement by prohibiting lawyers from creating them in the first in-
stance.  This proposal, if adopted, would mean that the defendant could never 
offer, nor the plaintiff’s lawyer urge acceptance of, a settlement contingent on 
secrecy if either lawyer reasonably believed that the information suppressed 
“concerns a substantial danger to the public health.”19  This difficult to enforce 
rule would be in considerable tension with what has traditionally been viewed 
as the lawyer’s central ethical obligation—to place her client’s interests ahead of 
any other. 
Public health advocates might consider a third possible line of attack on 
court-sponsored secrecy:  allowing the jury to use confidentiality agreements as 
a factor in weighing liability for punitive damages.  If courts are reluctant to de-
cide that confidentiality agreements affecting the public health are unenforce-
able as against public policy, they might consider the intermediate step of per-
mitting a jury to decide, given what the defendant knew and the plaintiff did 
not, whether the defendant’s conduct in insisting upon confidentiality agree-
ments in earlier suits involving the same product or practice merited punitive 
damages.  In a recent case, Richard Posner identified a defendant motel’s prac-
tice—resisting all claims arising from a bedbug infestation by refusing to settle 
and forcing all plaintiffs to litigate—as relevant to the damages that a defendant 
should pay for behaving outrageously.20  If a defendant who employs the full 
panoply of legally available litigation techniques to discourage meritorious 
plaintiffs in lawsuits involving relatively small injuries can be punished for that 
conduct, so too, could a defendant charged with inflicting serious injuries be 
 
 18. Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or What You Don’t Know Can Hurt 
You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115, 116 (1999). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Mathias v. Accor, 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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punished when that defendant requires confidentiality agreements in order to 
continue to manufacture a product that results in such injuries. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
With increasing attention to the use of scientific knowledge for policy and 
public health, it is time for those who would use information to protect the pub-
lic health to confront judges and lawyers who make the task far more difficult.  
Litigation-related secrecy can result in the withholding of information vital to 
protecting the public health, and the values served by permitting parties to se-
quester information do not obviously outweigh the public health interest that is 
potentially compromised.  We cannot know how many women would have es-
caped death or nonfatal septic abortion had the information about the Dalkon 
Shield been available earlier but there are a number of them.  Their fate weighs 
heavily against the values embodied in the manufacturer’s ability to suppress in-
formation by insisting on confidentiality when litigation disclosures would have 
been particularly damaging.  A ban on all secrecy agreements may be unen-
forceable and perhaps unwise.  Thus we suggest a range of options including ju-
dicial refusal to enter protective orders, ethical rules limiting attorney behavior, 
and punitive damages when nondisclosure leads to avoidable injury.  The law 
and legal practice should accommodate the community’s need for information 
relevant to the public health. 
